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Explaining policy deadlock: the case of Sarkozy’s integration policy 
What processes account for the deadlock in a given policy? While causes and 
mechanisms of policy change have been extensively researched, this paper sheds 
light on how formal institutional change can lead to policy deadlock. This paper 
examines two cases that demonstrate the absence of progress on integration 
policy during Sarkozy’s time in office (as a minister of the Interior and as a 
president). Drawing on elite interviews, the paper points out to how institutional 
change can lead to departmental competition within new or combined structures, 
leading to deadlock, as new layered actors do not always have the capacity to 
push old ones out, resulting in further institutional change. 
Keywords: policy deadlock, causal mechanisms; integration policy; Nicolas 
Sarkozy1.  
Introduction  
Integration has developed into a prominent issue in France in 1980s following 
the long-term settlement of millions of immigrants, who arrived from its former 
colonies - Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, but also from other countries of North Africa 
(Adida et al. 2014; Hollifield 2014). The question of integration has been quickly 
picked up by the radical right Front National. Following its first electoral success in 
1983, the integration issue became incorporated in the agenda of both left- and right-
wing parties (Guiraudon 2005: 156) and since then remained of crucial importance in 
France.  
Using the case of Sarkozy’s integration policy, I argue that institutional change 
led to departmental competition within newly created or merged structures, resulting in 
policy deadlock and further institutional change. More specifically, ‘institutional 
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layering – the introduction of new rules alongside the existing ones’ (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010: 15) generates departmental competition within new or merged institutions. 
Departmental competition acts as a constraint to the development and implementation 
of policy, encouraging opposition between senior civil servants, ministers and their 
staff, who refuse to cooperate, leading to policy deadlock. Policy deadlock is an 
inability of the institution and the staff in charge of policy-making to agree on the 
development of a specific policy. This, in turn, prevents policy change and leads to 
further institutional change. 
Integration policy was a cornerstone of Sarkozy’s political agenda during his 
time in the office, both as a minister of the Interior and as a president of France 
underwent some changes. When Sarkozy was appointed the minister of the Interior in 
Chirac’s government in 2002, he argued for positive discrimination of immigrants and 
French of immigrant origin. Following 2005 riots in French suburbs, Sarkozy’s 
integration policy paradigm changed from anti-discrimination to equal opportunities 
approach. The adoption of equal opportunities paradigm resulted in the creation of the 
new institution in charge of equal opportunities – ACSE (Agence Nationale pour la 
Cohesion Sociale et l’Egalité des Chances), which was placed under the authority of the 
Ministry of Urban Policy (Ministère de la Ville), leading to the first integration policy 
deadlock. The essence of this deadlock was that integration policy became dominated 
by the urban policy, which eventually resulted in the re-separation of these policies and 
transfer of integration policy to the Ministry of the Interior. A second integration policy 
deadlock occurred when the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and 
Co-Development that was designed to improve integration and created shortly after 
Sarkozy’s election as a president, was abolished three years later.  Sarkozy’s integration 
policy has been previously explained through a prism of causal factors, which included 
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mobilisation of particular sections of the electorate, intra-party competition and partisan 
veto players (Carvalho 2016; Carvalho and Geddes 2012). This article focuses on 
explaining these integration policy deadlocks by elucidating the mechanisms that 
accounted for it.   
The article proceeds as follows. The first part demonstrates how institutional 
change and departmental competition, which is a product of this change can be used to 
explain policy deadlocks. The second section proceeds with unpacking departmental 
competition, which explains integration policy deadlock which occurred as a result of 
the shift from anti-discrimination to equal opportunities paradigm during Sarkozy’s 
time as the minister of the Interior. The article then examines how ‘institutional 
layering’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) led to departmental 
tensions, which resulted in the abolishment of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, 
National Identity and Co-Development, which aimed to improve integration. 
Conclusion explains how institutional change can lead to tensions among ministers and 
their staff, and senior civil servants in these new or combined institutions, which results 
in policy deadlock and further institutional change.  
Methods  
This paper relies on process tracing as a method of within case analysis (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013; Beach and Pedersen 2016; Bennett and Checkel 2015; Blatter and 
Blume 2008; Bennett  2010). It views causal mechanisms as probabilistic, meaning that 
their operation cannot be pre-determined but is intimately context-dependent (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013; Faletti and Lynch 2009). A probabilistic understanding of 
mechanisms helps to make stronger causal inferences than a deterministic one, by 
stressing the importance of appropriate contextualisation of mechanisms to avoid 
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flawed causal inferences (Bengtsson and Herrting 2014; Faletti and Lynch 2009;) and 
generalises causal mechanisms based on the context in which they operate.  
The explanation of integration policy deadlock during Sarkozy’s time in office 
relies on twelve semi-structured interviews, including Sarkozy’s former adviser, the 
current French prime minister, French senior civil servants from the Ministry of the 
Interior and later the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-
Development and senior Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) MP politicians2.  
The first-hand accounts explaining integration policy deadlocks were collected 
over the course of several trips to Paris in 2016. As an outsider to France, and the 
French political class, it was difficult to obtain responses from potential interviewees. 
At the initial stage I contacted potential interviewees via email and phone. In order to 
increase the number of interviewees, I employed snowballing technique, which proved 
to be successful. All interviews were conducted face-to-face. 
 Elite interviews are the best option to document and explain integration policy 
making as they allow researchers ‘to obtain accounts from the direct witnesses to the 
events in question’ (Tansey, 2007: 767). Furthermore, they ‘offer political scientists a 
rich, cost-effective vehicle for generating unique data to investigate the complexities of 
policy making’ (Beamer 2002: 86). While understanding that targeted sampling can 
cause selection bias (King et al. 1994), it is the best strategy to explain the policy gaps 
as ‘certain categories of individuals may have unique, different or important perspective 
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and their presence in the sample should be insured’ (Robinson 2014: 32). Where 
possible, I corroborated the evidence from the interviews with primary sources, but 
most of the observations rely on information provided by the interviewees, which is not 
in public record. 
Explaining policy deadlock: an institutionalist approach 
A number of studies highlight that different sets of actors can influence policy-
making process, including interest groups (Hampshire and Bale 2015; Freeman 1995; 
2001), ethnic groups (Abadan-Unat 2017) and courts (Guiraudon 1997; Joppke 1998). 
This paper argues that political elites, ministers, senior civil servants and street-level 
bureaucrats (Consterdine 2015; Lipsky 1979; Somerville 1997; van der Leun 2003) and 
institutions that they work within played a key role in creating integration policy 
deadlock. Taking the change from anti-discrimination to equal opportunities paradigm 
in 2006 and the creation and abolishment of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, 
National Identity and Co-Development as cases, the paper points to institutional 
layering and departmental competition as mechanisms that explain integration policy 
deadlock and highlights the crucial role that senior ministerial advisers, ministers and 
civil servants played in it. It takes an institutionalist perspective, arguing that integration 
policy deadlock stems from institutional change. 
This paper makes a contribution to public policy literature by explaining how 
formal institutional change can account for policy deadlock, in other words, any 
progress on a given policy development. As institutions ‘both constrain and condition 
the behaviour of political actors’ (Consterdine 2015: 131), institutional change has a 
direct impact on a policy change or on the absence thereof. Therefore, one needs to look 
at the institutional change and its different mechanisms to explain why there has not 
been any progress made on a given policy. Some of such mechanisms include 
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‘institutional layering’, which Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 15) define as ‘the 
introduction of new rules on top of existing ones’, which affects the behaviour of the 
actors in that institution (Thelen 2003). Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 17) argue that 
layering can lead to substantial policy change. While Streeck and Thelen (2005: 31) 
posit that institutional layering destabilises institutions, where the old core is usually 
replaced by the new core, this paper contributes to the literature on institutional change 
by arguing that it is not necessarily the case and that new layers can be pushed out by 
the old core, leading to policy deadlock and further institutional change. 
As institutions tend to resist the change, both in terms of circumstances and 
actors’ preferences (March and Olsen 1989; 1995), institutional layering can lead to the 
tensions that arise within the institutions, which have been labeled as ‘departmental 
competition’ (Hampshire and Bale 2015) or ‘departmentalism’ (Kavanaugh and 
Richards 2001). This mechanism has been used to explain the formation of Labour’s 
liberal immigration policy regime (Consterdine 2015; Consterdine 2018) and the 
introduction of restrictive immigration policies under the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat government (Hampshire and Bale 2015). This paper highlights how formal 
institutional change can result in departmental competition, which leads to policy 
deadlock. Departmental tensions can be a result of the political relationships between 
actors (Suleiman 1976) where different departments want to reassure their centrality in 
policy-making process (Bezes 2009). The competition is usually structured by power 
relations within institution, where different departments have unequal policy influence 
because of the lack of financial resources or the lack of information to assert influence 
(Suleiman 1974). The competition is also aggravated by the autonomy that civil 
servants working in these departments acquire (Geniyes 2005), which stems from the 
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education practices in the Grandes Ecoles they graduate from (Birnbaum 1982; 
Bourdieu, 1996).  
Integration policy deadlock can be explained by focusing on the role of 
ministers and their administrations in policy-making process. When institutional change 
happens, it triggers departmental competition within new structure. The tensions within 
new institutions responsible for a given policy-making are structured not only by 
different weight that departments have within an institution, but also by considerable 
autonomy that civil servants and ministers acquire during their careers.  
From anti-discrimination to equal opportunities paradigm 
Shortly after his appointment as Minister of the Interior in Chirac’s government in 
2002, Sarkozy promised to improve integration by taking a positive discrimination 
approach towards foreigners and French of immigrant origin (issus de l’immigration). 
As minister of the Interior, Sarkozy stressed the importance of making integration more 
efficient by focusing on the integration of those people, who were discriminated in the 
communities, which by and large are populated with immigrants and the French of 
immigrant origin (Simon 2009). This positive discrimination approach was bold and 
distinguished Sarkozy from president Chirac’s position, putting him at odds with the the 
French republican tradition, where individuals are defined without considering their 
gender, social and ethnic background and place of residence (Drake 2011; Marthaler 
2008; Simon 2007).  
Sarkozy’s integration approach was centered around cultural integration, 
supporting the ban of religious symbols in state schools (Loi encadrant, en application 
du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance 
religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics), but neglected socio-economic 
integration in socially deprived areas with high immigrant concentration. It had not 
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focused on addressing economic integration, which meant incorporating people into 
French society by erasing discrimination against immigrants and the French of 
immigrant origin, creating opportunities for achieving better educational results, 
decreasing unemployment and increasing wages. As a number of interviewees pointed 
out, addressing integration only from cultural perspective, which has been notably 
advocated by FN, was Sarkozy’s attempt to neutralise the competitor, which, similarly 
to Sarkozy, did not care about improving the economic position of immigrants and 
providing better chances for them (Interview with the current French prime minister 
Edouard Phillipe 2016; Interview with the UMP MP 2016). It was more acceptable to 
show the electorate that on cultural integration Sarkozy toughened the rules, it was more 
politically risky to address economic integration (Interview with Sarkozy’s former 
adviser 2016). An absence of political will explains the lack of socio-economic 
integration, as Sarkozy feared that increasing economic investment into integration 
would not find widespread public support (Interview with Marie-José Bernardot, former 
head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the 
Interior 2016).  
As 2005 riots highlighted socio-economic deprivation in Parisian suburbs and in 
French suburbs more generally, Sarkozy was forced to address socio-economic 
integration. The riots erupted in Parisian suburbs, showing a public backlash against the 
electrocution of two teenagers of immigrant origin who were followed by the French 
police (Mucchielli and Goaizou 2007). They signalled the marginalisation of French 
citizens of immigrant origins by the French authorities, not the positive discrimination 
that Sarkozy promised in 2002 (Marthaler 2008). The riots led to the evolution of 
integration policy, by triggering an important change in Sarkozy’s integration approach, 
shifting it from an anti-discrimination to an equal opportunities paradigm. Sarkozy 
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decided to replace the institution responsible for discrimination against immigrants and 
French issus de l’immigration FASILD (Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration 
et la lutte contre les discriminations) with ACSE. The anti-discrimination paradigm had 
been implemented by the FASILD, a governmental agency that had been in charge of 
integration of immigrants or those of immigrant origin, living primarily in 
disadvantaged areas (quartiers prioritaires) as well as the fight against their 
discrimination (Senat n. d.).  
Name change also reflected change in mission. While FASILD targeted 
discrimination of the immigrants and French of immigrant origin, ACSE was no longer 
working with the immigrant population and instead focused on reducing territorial 
inequalities (Escafré-Dublet 2014: 5). Policy of equality of opportunity applied to all 
French citizens irrespective of their origin, but by and large, ACSE’s policies ‘while not 
targeted – disproportionally affected people of immigrant descent (Escafré-Dublet 2014: 
5). But as ACSE’s role did not envisage the notion of fighting against discrimination 
thus hindering socio-economic integration of immigrants and French of immigrant 
origin (Lepinard and Simon 2008; Noël 2008). This was not in line with the positive 
discrimination approach promised by Sarkozy because the new institution – ACSE was 
designed to promote equal opportunities to those living in socially deprived areas 
(quartiers prioritaires), but not fight against discrimination of these people, as was 
previously done by FASILD.  This represented the change from the promise of positive 
integration of immigrants and French of immigrant origin to the adoption of the new 
paradigm, which promoted equal opportunities for every French citizen, not just 
immigrants or those issus de l’immigration. This change in integration approach erased 
an important legal instrument of punishment of those who were discriminating, not 
helping to ensure the equality of opportunities: 
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Nicolas Sarkozy closes the only public institution in charge of discrimination - 
FASILD and proposes to create the ACSE that will focus on the notion of equal 
opportunities […] which is not attached to legal framework, meaning that in case 
of discrimination you cannot sentence anyone. (Interview with a former regional 
director of FASILD and ACSE, Frédéric Callens 2016). 
Replacing FASILD, ACSE as a new social actor reunited urban policy (la 
politique de la ville) and integration policy and was placed under the authority of the 
Ministry of Urban Policy (Le Ministère de la Ville). I argue that integration policy 
deadlock occurred because ACSE was layered to the existing institution – the Ministry 
of Urban Policy, which led to the domination of urban policy over integration, 
eventually resulting in the re-separation of these policies and transfer of integration into 
a different institution – Ministry of the Interior. While Streeck and Thelen (2005: 31) 
argue that institutional layering destabilizes existing institutions, resulting in the defeat 
of the old layer, the case of urban policy domination within ACSE under the Ministry of 
Urban Policy demonstrates that the opposite can be true. It shows how a new 
institutional layer (integration policy) does not necessarily defeat the old one (urban 
policy), leading to integration policy deadlock. The competition within ACSE between 
integration and urban policy led to unequal redistribution of financial resources, which 
were disproportionately allocated in favour of urban policy. As a former head of the 
Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, 
Marie-José Bernardot explained:  
It took time to reform the administration and harmonisation of urban policy with 
the policy of integration, which originally belonged to two different ministries – 
Ministry of Urban Policy and Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, which 
resulted in the domination of urban policy and received the majority of the ACSE’s 
budget (Interview with a former head of the Office for territorial, social and 
cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot 2016).  
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Institutional layering led to the intra-departmental competition within ACSE, 
where none of the actors were ready to compromise, resulting in the failure of 
integration policy. A former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frédéric Callens 
underlined:  
Departmental competition within the newly formed institution - ACSE resulted in 
the re-separation of these policies. The wish of every administration to have their 
own budget and independent decision-making powers, which made cooperation 
impossible, precipitated the failure of integration policy (Interview with a former 
regional director of FASILD and ACSE Frédéric Callens, 2016). 
 This competition arises as a result of the political relationships between actors 
(Suleiman 1976). Different subdivisions within ACSE were driven by different goals, 
which made cooperation between them problematic. Furthermore, such competition is 
structured by power relations that exist within a single organisation, where different 
autonomous subdivisions might have unequal influence (Suleiman 1974: 149). In the 
case of ACSE, weak subdivisions like integration policy were ‘unable to obtain 
necessary information for asserting the influence […] and without the necessary means 
cannot overcome the hostilities’ of other subdivisions (Suleiman 1974: 150).  
As a result of the inability of integration policy actors to exert influence on the 
Ministry of the City in terms of decision-making and allocation of resources, integration 
policy was placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, and later under 
the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development. 
Institutional layering, which attached ACSE to the Ministry of Urban Policy caused 
departmental tensions between integration and urban policy, leading to the domination 
of the latter and integration policy deadlock.   
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Creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and 
Co-Development  
When Sarkozy announced he would run for the presidency, integration and national 
identity became one of the major topics of Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential campaign with 
the promise of the creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National 
Identity and Co-Development, which would be responsible for tackling the so-called 
crisis of national identity and improving integration (Ivaldi 2008). Sarkozy pledged that 
all immigration matters, including integration would be incorporated under the umbrella 
of one ministry: Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-
Development (Sarkozy 2007: 14). By associating immigration with the crisis of national 
identity, Sarkozy aimed to attract part of the FN’s electorate (Carvalho 2017; Mayer 
2007). Shortly after becoming the president, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, 
National Identity and Co-Development was created, whose role was to ‘improve the 
social integration of immigrants, and to promote national identity’ (Duelund 2016: 213). 
However, linking immigration to national identity provoked strong criticisms among 
liberals (Ocak 2016) because it ‘legitimised perceptions of immigration representing a 
threat to national identity. The rhetoric around the creation of this ministry was a sign of 
‘soft nationalism’ (Noiriel 2007) and aimed at targeting FN voters during the 
presidential campaign by stressing the importance of national identity and integration 
(Marlière 2013: 33). 
One of the major events, associated with new Ministry was the debate on 
national identity, which was launched on Sarkozy’s demand by immigration minister 
Eric Besson in October 2009 (Le Monde 2009). With the pressure not only from the 
left-wing camp, but also from within his own party, this debate was quickly abandoned 
in February 2010 when, after three months of discussions on Islam and xenophobia, 
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Sarkozy was forced to halt the debate because the public viewed it as unconstructive 
(Lemarié 2012). Public dissatisfaction with the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, 
National Identity and Co-Development and with the national identity debate led to the 
halt of the debate with Sarkozy publicly recognising that it ‘had led to tensions and 
misunderstandings’ (Duelund 2016: 213). Aiming to boost his electoral base, Sarkozy 
has not realised that national identity was not something specific or easy to define, 
especially in a country like France, which has a long colonial history. As one of the 
UMP MP’s pointed out: 
Sarkozy’s strategy to start the debate was a political sign for the FN’s electorate, 
made to reassure them that national identity would be taken care of, but the big 
mistake was that nobody knew what national identity is, it was something that was 
difficult to describe’ (Interview with the UMP MP 2016).  
While the halt of the national identity debate is explained by public disapproval, 
what accounted for the dissolution of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National 
Identity and Co-Development? It was abolished in November 2010 with immigration 
affairs being placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior (Wihtol de 
Wenden 2012: 326). The dissolution of the Ministry, which aimed to improve 
integration and tackle national identity crisis represented another integration policy 
deadlock.  
Shortly after Sarkozy was elected as president, he created the new Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development in 2007, reuniting the 
Ministry of Integration and Social Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry 
of Work under its umbrella. In case of the new Ministry, which united the 
responsibilities of three different ministries that had their own stabilized rules and 
conventions, such layering did not result in policy change, but led to opposition of the 
ministers and their administrations to work together. As Sarkozy’s former adviser 
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highlighted, there was strong resistance by each of the ministers and their 
administrations to any compromise on integration, including sharing a common budget 
and decision-making powers (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). 
Institutional layering led to departmental competition, which referred to the competition 
among staff from three different ministries: the Ministry of Integration and Social 
Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Work. Departmental 
competition implies that policy change is affected by the policy-making logics of 
different departments within one institution with the departments to have known to 
protect their interests rather than contribute to the overall policy as they have developed 
specific cultures of policy-making within their own departments or ministries. The 
conflicts among ministers and their administration are a result of the politicisation of the 
French civil servants that have their own political loyalties (Suleiman 1978). 
Considerable autonomy that civil servants acquire (Genieys 2005: 416), which is 
enshrined in the educational practices of the French Grandes Ecoles that they attend 
(Birnbaum 1982; Bourdieu 1996) explains their resistance to cooperation.  
 Interministerial tensions, which included the resistance to share decision-making 
powers and path-dependancy of policy-making practices that three ministries and their 
administrations had, were highlighted by civil servants working inside the Ministry 
(Interview with a senior civil servant 2016) and by the former head of Interministerial 
Committee on Immigration Control Patrick Stefanini:  
So, we have made it badly, we have put all together. The administrations that have 
reunited in this new ministry, did not really work together. In addition, there are 
physical constraints as well. When the people want to work together, physical 
constraints do not matter. Physically people are in different ministries, but legally 
they are under authority of one Ministry of Immigration. And, we have not put 
different services in the Ministry that we should have put because there was a lot of 
disagreement between the ministries. The new Ministry was created, but the people 
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did not want to work together and in three years the Ministry has been dissolved. 
(Interview with a senior civil servant and a former head of Interministerial 
Committee on Immigration Control Patrick Stefanini 2016). 
The conflicts among different ministries reunited under one institution stem 
from the fact that each ministry aimed to ‘reaffirm its centrality in the governance 
process’ (Bezes 2009; 2016). In the context of new Ministry, the conflict related ‘to the 
chains of hierarchical authority that govern relations between multiple levels of 
organization (distribution of tasks, circulation of information and modes of control’ 
(Bezes 2007: 21). Institutional layering, which fused immigration and integration 
matters under the authority of three ministries into one, led to departmental tensions 
within the new institution, which accounted for integration policy deadlock. As a result, 
the Ministry was eventually dissolved in 2010.  
Furthermore, departmental tensions also arose between ACSE, who was a social 
actor and three ministries that were merged into the Ministry of Immigration, 
Integration, National Identity and Co-Development. Following the separation of urban 
and integration policies, which were originally attached to the Ministry of the Urban 
Policy, ACSE was first placed under the umbrella of the Ministry of Integration and 
later transferred to the authority of the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, 
National Identity and Co-development. This organisational layering of ACSE as a social 
actor to the new Ministry resulted in new departmental tensions, now between the staff 
from ACSE, who was responsible for integration matters and ministerial staff. As 
former regional director or FASILD and ACSE Frédéric Callens explained, the 
inclusion of integration policy under the new Ministry led to the exclusion of social 
actors like the ACSE from strategic planning and governance, which was dominated by 
the ministerial staff (Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE 
Frédéric Callens 2016). The tensions arose between the Ministry staff and the ACSE 
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staff  as the latter were not given freedom to act and their decision-making powers were 
limited. This organizational layering can equally cause policy deadlocks.  
Those who come from ACSE, they find themselves in the new organism that tells 
them to do things differently, to do different things and to use different methods, 
other objectives and other actors (Interview with the former head of the Office or 
territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior Marie-José 
Bernardot, 2016). 
Sarkozy’s attempt to incorporate integration matters under the Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development led to the exclusion of 
social actors from the decision-making and implementation process, which was 
dominated by ministerial actors. These departmental conflicts, in addition to 
departmental competition between Ministry of Integration and Social Affairs, Ministry 
of the Interior and Ministry of Work, led to the integration policy deadlock and to the 
eventual dissolution of the Ministry in late 2010.  
Conclusion 
Using the case of Sarkozy’s integration policy, this paper contributed to the public 
policy literature by demonstrating how mechanisms that explain policy change also can 
account for policy deadlock. In this paper I argued that policy deadlock can be 
explained through institutional change, specifically institutional layering, which triggers 
departmental competition within newly created or merged structures, resulting in policy 
deadlock and further institutional change. The paper emphasizes that institutional 
change does not necessarily cause policy change as previously theorized, but instead 
can lead to policy deadlock, causing further institutional change, rather than policy 
change. Furthermore, when departmental tensions occur as a result of layering, the new 
core does not necessarily suppress the old core, as it has been demonstrated with the 
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case of integration policy within ACSE under the authority of the Ministry of Urban 
Policy.  
First integration policy deadlock occurred when integration was placed under 
the authority of the Ministry of Urban Policy, as a result of the changing policy 
paradigm from anti-discrimination to equal opportunities. It is explained by institutional 
layering that fused urban policy with integration policy, triggering in departmental 
tensions, which resulted in re-separation of these policies and transfer of integration 
matters to the Ministry of the Interior. Second integration policy deadlock occurred 
when the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development 
that was designed to improve integration was abolished three years later. Institutional 
layering of three ministers: the Ministry of Integration and Social Affairs, the Ministry 
of the Interior and the Ministry of Work under one led to the resistance among former 
ministers and their administrations to work together on integration leading to its 
dissolution.  
Institutional layering and departmental competition Ministry of Immigration, 
Integration, National Identity and Co-Development can be useful not only in shedding 
light on why there has not been any progress on a given policy, but they can also be 
used to understand the changing nature of the institutions that are responsible for it.  
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